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The law regarding domestic relations has undergone far greater change during
the past fifteen years than it experienced during the half century, perhaps even the
entire century, before. Domestic relations law somehow was ignored in reform move-
ments that reshaped private law doctrine in other contexts during those earlier peri-
ods. The resulting lag between the law on the books and in the cases and the drastic
transformation of various patterns of social conduct can be offered to explain why the
legal change has been so great in some quarters. The speed at whi6h major law
revision went forward, once it had begun, can be attributed to both a pent-up demand
for reform caused by past reluctance of legislators to confront potentially divisive
issues about changing values and lifestyles that they considered politically threaten-
ing and a long overdue shift by courts away from unwillingness to entertain con-
stitutional challenges to even the most anachronistic and discriminatory state law
provisions. Not until the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decisions in
Griswold v. Connecticut' and Loving v. Virginia2 less than twenty years ago was it
evident that courts would apply a constitutional yardstick to gauge the validity of state
laws on marriage and the family in other than very special circumstances.3 By
creating an awareness that long-ignored statutes had become vulnerable to judicial
challenges, 4 Griswold, Loving, and decisions that soon followed in their wake further
served as a catalyst for legislative review and reform. Many state legislatures adopted
statutory changes quickly once their individual members realized that modernization
of domestic relations laws to reflect contemporary mores could be a political asset
rather than the liability they once feared it would be.
Because of the speed at which change has taken place and because legislative
action often focused at first on such specific targets as divorce grounds and, more
recently, matrimonial property, some areas were late in receiving adequate attention
of a structured nature. Special problems were created through inadequate advance
assessment of the potential impact that changes in an area such as divorce grounds
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1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Some persons at first chose to regard Loving as distinguishable because it dealt with discrimination based on
race, id. at 2. See, e.g., In re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 512 P.2d 1028 (1973). Thus, they questioned whether a trend
toward constitutionalizing domestic relations law would develop. Such a limited reading of the Loving opinion since has
proved wrong. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
4. For an example of the scholarly commentary that helped foster this awareness, see Drinan, The Loving Decision
and the Freedom to Marty, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 358 (1968).
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might produce in other areas such as child custody. The parent-child relationship
provides a number of illustrations of this. For example, today's high incidence of
both divorce and remarriage (anticipatable as a logical result of shifting to "break-
down grounds" for divorce5) almost inevitably increases problems of initial child
custody decisionmaking and subsequent contests over modification.
Development of ways to accommodate the rights and interests of children as
well as their divorced parents in such an environment has been especially perplexing.
A movement toward increased latitude in private ordering by divorcing parties has
raised fear that children might become pawns to be sacrificed in the process of
making economic tradeoffs. Further concern has focused on whether and how to
eliminate the vestiges of long-standing sexual stereotypes from an earlier day that still
are mirrored in the presumptions that judges apply to reach child custody de-
terminations in some jurisdictions. Substitutes proposed for dealing most effectively
with custody disputes vary considerably in approach. Some reformers would remove
virtually all custody issues, including visitation, from further judicial review once an
initial determination has been made, except in those extreme cases when children
obviously should be shifted for their protection, when there is justification for ter-
minating parental rights, or when a new parent-child relationship has been established
de facto if not de jure.6 Others would come as close as possible, both physically and
psychologically, to the alternative proposed by Solomon. 7 An important factor some-
times ignored, both in past use of presumptions and some of the solutions now being
proposed, is the need to balance the interests of all parties-including the children
involved-to reach a satisfactory result. Joint custody is regarded by some as a
possible answer, but by others as a dangerous form of experimentation with children.
Whatever the pros and cons, some thirty states now have statutes dealing with this
latest popular approach, most of them adopted within the past three or four years. In
Rethinking Joint Custody, Professor Elizabeth Scott, a law teacher, and Dr. Andre
Derdeyn, a child psychiatrist, analyze the various categories of joint custody statutes
and examine what we know (and do not know) about the practical effects of joint
custody on children. The authors express concern about moving too far too fast on the
basis of our present limited understanding of this approach, and they raise important
questions about the possibility that the new laws may inappropriately influence de-
termination of judicial awards to one or the other competing parent in lieu of joint
custody.
Problems stemming from lack of attention to the interests of children in changes
ostensibly made to protect individual rights or to facilitate reform in accord with
5. One of the tenets of the movement shifting from "fault" to "breakdown" grounds was that by making divorce a
less traumatic experience, the new grounds would overcome the reluctance to remarry for fear of repeated exposure to the
bitterness, recrimination, or dissembling that too often characterized contested divorce proceedings under the former
system. See, e.g., Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32, 84 (1966).
6. The most widely discussed proposal along these lines is contained in the seminal work, J. GotaosraN, A. FREUD
& A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEsT INrEREsrs OF THE CHILD (1973). The "Selected Provisions for the Child Placement
Code of Hampstead-Haven," id. at 97-101, embody the concept of "Final Unconditional Disposal," id. at 101. In a
subsequent work the same authors set forth a proposal that would narrowly limit intervention in the parent-child relation-
ship. J. GoLosTmmN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrT, BEFORE THE BEST INTEREsTs OF THE CHILD 187-96 app. (1979).
7. See 1 Kings 3:16.
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current norms have not been restricted to the fallout from legislative action or in-
action. Courts have caused confusion by not understanding or anticipating the poten-
tial stare decisis impact of their decisions on children, particularly when the issues
have been unbriefed, unargued, and thus never presented adequately to them for
consideration. The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois8 produced chaos
for the nonrelative adoption process in many states even though Stanley was not an
adoption case. The Court's language in the now celebrated footnote nine of its
opinion9 made clear that the decision would have an impact on adoption, although the
scope of the rights of unwed fathers and the extent to which interests of their children
could be taken into account in the legislative responses that the decision made neces-
sary were left with few, if any, meaningful guidelines. 10 Three major decisions
dealing with these issues have been decided by the Court in the eleven years since
Stanley. II Lehr v. Robertson, 12 the most recent of them, may have provided better
keys to understanding the nature of the unwed father's parental rights and the cir-
cumstances under which they can be denied. Professor Elizabeth Buchanan, in The
Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, care-
fully examines the rationale of these opinions and the framework in which the issues
with which they dealt arose. After examining the interests that are at stake, she seeks
to establish a constitutional basis for protecting parental interests of unwed fathers in
establishing and continuing relationships with their children.
As noted earlier, gaining access to the courts was essential in launching the
recent cycle of family law reform. High in relative significance among recent con-
stitutional decisions dealing with the parent-child relationship have been those con-
cerned with insuring that procedural due process is afforded those whose interests
may be affected in peremptory decisions such as termination of parental rights.
13
(Among issues still unresolved is the minimum standard of parenting that can be
required in a proceeding characterized by appropriate procedural safeguards.) As
major attention shifts from divorce and matrimonial property reform to issues about
the permissible degree of state intervention in the family, availability of fora to
entertain questions about the exercise of authority by governmental agencies again
will be a major concern. Of special interest is whether federal courts will be available
to hear such causes, a question addressed in different contexts by two imaginative
articles in the Symposium. In an early series of decisions that some consider to be of
questionable validity today, federal courts developed a policy of abstaining in the vast
bulk of family law cases, including those dealing with divorce and child custody,
even when the usual requisites for jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship were
8. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. Id. at 657 n.9.
10. See Note, The "Strange Boundaries" ofStanley: Providing Notice ofAdoption to the Unknown Putative Father,
59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
11. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
12. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
13. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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present. 14 Federal courts more recently have played an important role in cases raising
constitutional challenges to state statutes addressing issues ranging from regulation of
abortion and contraception to limitations on capacity to marry. 15 Habeas corpus has
been the vehicle used to mount some of these attacks, particularly in criminal cases.'
6
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 17 the Supreme Court
limited use of this writ as an avenue for federal court review in child custody cases.
Professor Martin Guggenheim, a veteran litigator in the field (and one of the attor-
neys in Lehman) reviews the current problems and possibilities of getting into federal
court to challenge child protection laws in State Intervention in the Family: Making a
Federal Case Out of It.
Professor Joan Krauskopf, in Remedies for Parental Kidnapping in Federal
Court: A Comment Applying the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in Support of
Judge Edwards, analyzes the considerable legislative attention that has been paid to
one set of contemporary problems of the parent-child relationship: interstate child
custody disputes. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) I8 at first
languished for almost a decade after its promulgation in 1968 and then finally
achieved widespread adoption among the states over a period of several years. Late in
1980 the United States Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA),1 9 which in some ways complements and in others arguably conflicts with
UCCJA, depending on one's interpretation. 20 Professor Krauskopf develops the
thesis that as a result of the PKPA, federal courts should entertain requests to enforce
prior custody decrees of another state in actions based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. The goal of this and other suggestions that she makes for increasing the
availability of federal jurisdiction of interstate custody disputes would be to assure
national application of uniform jurisdictional standards in enforcement and modifica-
tion of child custody decrees and thereby decrease the incidence of child abduction.
Ohio has adopted a modified version of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),2 1
another uniform law that may be destined to receive greater legislative acceptance
eventually. The Ohio version of the UPA22 omits section five of the Act, a provision
that takes a first step toward dealing with the vexing legal problems of heterologous
artificial insemination (AID) by defining the status of a child conceived through the
process by a married woman with her husband's consent. Susan Eisenman, in Fa-
thers, Biological and Anonymous, and Other Legal Strangers: Determinations of
Parentage and Artificial Insemination by Donor Under Ohio Law, describes the
14. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858); Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973). Fora copiously annotated opinion on the subject,
see Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
15. See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
17. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
18. 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968).
19. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3567 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 663
(Supp. V 1981). 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982)).
20. See Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REv. 711
(1982); Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiciton: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 297 (1981).
21. 9 U.L.A. 587 (1973).
22. Ono REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01-.19 (Page Supp. 1983).
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consequence of omitting section five of the UPA and analyzes pending remedial
legislation. She also looks at some of the legal problems that can result from using
AID in other situations-for example, usage for surrogate parenting or for providing
children for single women-that are not addressed by the UPA or present legislative
proposals in Ohio.
23
With the amount of recent activity in this area, it is not surprising that law school
teaching materials are being updated frequently and new books are being published.
The Symposium closes with Professor Lynn Wardle's review of American Family
Law in Transition, a recent innovative addition to the field produced by two veteran
scholars, Professors Walter Weyrauch and Sanford Katz.
The hallmark of this symposium is its presentation of a collection of articles that,
although varied in scope, are all especially timely and relevant for assisting in the
resolution of major contemporary issues concerning the parent-child relationship.
23. Ohio is not alone in its apparent unwillingness to enact legislation to deal with these issues. See Wadlington,
Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 482 (1983).

